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ABSTRACT 
Manpower modeling plays a significant role in the growth and management of 
today’s militaries.  Unfortunately, existing models do not properly address the challenges 
facing the growth of recently established indigenous security forces.  This thesis develops 
a linear program to plan the generation of a recently established indigenous security force 
over an unknown (infinite) horizon.  The Security Force Generation Model (SFGM) is 
different from standard personnel models in four ways: it combines the growth of the 
enlisted and officer corps into a single model; it plans force growth over an infinite 
horizon; it provides a variable-time planning horizon with monthly and annual fidelity; 
and it incorporates the growth of the force through standard recruitment, a legacy force, 
and enlisted accessions.  SFGM prescribes monthly and annual promotion rates, 
recruitment goals, accessions from the enlisted corps, and inclusion of the preexisting 
security apparatus.  We demonstrate SFGM using current data from the Afghan National 
Army (ANA), under scenarios focused on the recently announced need to grow it from 
81,000 to 134,000 soldiers.  Our analysis shows that the ANA is capable of reaching the 
desired end strength in 28 months, but this requires enlisted accessions as the primary 
means of filling the officer corps and inclusion of the legacy force.  Without the legacy 
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THESIS DISCLAIMER 
The reader is cautioned that the computer programs developed in this research 
may not have been exercised for all cases of interest.  While every effort has been made, 
within the time available, to ensure that the programs are free of computational and logic 
errors, they cannot be considered validated.  Any application of these programs without 
additional verification is at the risk of the user. 
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Manpower modeling plays a significant role in the growth and management of 
today’s militaries.  Unfortunately, existing models do not properly capture the challenges 
facing the growth of recently established indigenous security forces.  This thesis develops 
a linear program to plan the generation of a recently established indigenous security 
force.  The Security Force Generation Model (SFGM) prescribes monthly promotion 
rates, recruitment goals, accessions from the enlisted corps, and inclusion of the 
preexisting security apparatus if desired.  SFGM is unique from standard personnel 
models in four ways: it combines the growth of the enlisted and officer corps into a single 
model; it plans force growth over an unknown (infinite) horizon; it provides a variable 
time planning horizon with monthly and annual fidelity; and it incorporates the growth of 
the force through standard recruitment, a legacy force, and enlisted accessions.  Prior to 
the development of SFGM, planners only had heuristics that incompletely addressed the 
issues of how to grow an indigenous security force.  
We demonstrate SFGM using the Afghan National Army (ANA) and many 
scenarios focused on the recently announced need to grow its force size from 81,000 to 
134,000.  We develop five primary scenarios.  Scenario 1 grows the ANA using current 
recruitment capabilities, attrition rates, legacy force, and no lower bounds on promotion.  
Scenario 2 restricts monthly and yearly lower and upper bounds on promotions to control 
month-to-month and year-to-year fluctuations.  Scenario 3 excludes the legacy force.  
Scenario 4 improves enlisted reenlistment rates from 50 percent to 70 percent at the 
beginning of the fourth year.  Scenario 5 includes no enlisted accessions and grows the 
officer corps with only recruitment and the legacy force.     
We find that at least 24 months are required for the ANA to reach its desired end 
strength under current recruiting capabilities even with the inclusion of the legacy force, 
accessions of enlisted soldiers to the officer corps, and large fluctuations in promotion 
rates.  It requires four additional months with the elimination of the large fluctuations.  
We also find that the ANA must exceed the desired strength by up to 4,000 soldiers in  
 
 xxii
order to absorb losses that occur due to the large-scale enlistment in the first three years.  
The lieutenant end strength must also increase above current target levels to provide a 
stable promotion base for senior ranks. 
Growth of the officer corps relies heavily on enlisted accessions and the inclusion 
of approximately 3,300 officers from the legacy force.  The officer corps never reaches 
its required end state without enlisted accessions unless Lieutenant recruitment increases 
from 500 to 1,700 annually.  With enlisted accessions but without the legacy force, it 
requires five years for the officer corps to reach the desired end strength (almost three 
years longer).  Inclusion of the legacy force is especially useful in the top two ranks 
because it slows the rate of promotion and allows the officer corps to build strength in the 
lower three ranks.  Unlike the officer corps, enlisted legacy force soldiers are unnecessary 
for the enlisted corps to reach its target strength. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
Si Vis Pacem, Para Bellum.  (If you want peace, prepare for war.) 
Flavius Vegetius Renatus, 390 A.D. 
 
A. PURPOSE 
As the United States enters the twenty-first century, its Army finds itself facing a 
new paradigm in military operations.  Where the defeat of enemy formations was 
previously a primary focus, today creating indigenous security forces capable of 
assuming the fight and securing the population is its equal (Army 2008).  This thesis 
develops a linear program to help plan the generation of a new indigenous security force.  
The Security Force Generation Model (SFGM) determines monthly promotion rates, 
recruitment goals, accessions from the enlisted corps, and inclusion of the preexisting 
security apparatus.    SFGM provides the information necessary to assess the feasibility 
of the growth of an indigenous security force.    
On 7 October 2001, the United States entered the first of two major theaters of 
war with Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan.  By May 2002, low intensity 
guerilla warfare replaced major combat operations against the Taliban and the United 
States Special Forces began the process of reconstructing the Afghan National Army 
(Jalali 2002).  On 20 March 2003, the United States launched Operation Iraqi Freedom.  
By August of 2003, major combat operations ended and the generation of the new Iraqi 
Army was under way.  Given the similarity between these two campaigns, our recent 
history suggests that future military engagements will resolve themselves to protracted 
low intensity conflicts, where the development of indigenous forces will be a decisive 
element in establishing security and winning the battle for the population (Army 2008).  
Force generation refers to the combination of enlisted and officer personnel 
policies that manage the growth of the total force.  An organization controls force 
generation through levels of recruitment for both officers and enlisted, promotion rates, 
and forced separation.  Managing these allows an organization to attain the desired force 
size and composition.  The major challenge facing a growing force is balancing these 
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variables to create a rank structure that allows for upward mobility.  Failure to manage a 
rapidly growing force will result in an excess of personnel at certain positions and will 
have a major impact on retention as promotion potential decreases.  
This thesis provides a force generation model that assists in understanding the 
challenges in developing indigenous security forces.  Given the desired size and time 
horizon to grow the force, SFGM provides the decision maker with a set of personnel 
management requirements to meet given goals.  We demonstrate SFGM using current 
data from the ANA under scenarios focused on the recently announced need to grow its 
force size from 81,000 to 134,000.   
B. MOTIVATION FOR BUILDING SFGM 
With increasing global instability, there is a greater likelihood of collapsed or 
failed states.  Whether the nexus of a state’s failure is direct military action or internal 
political failure, the results are the same: a non-existent or weakened central government 
and security apparatus.  These states pose several significant threats: they provide a safe 
haven for terrorists and other groups, and may create conflict, regional instability, and 
humanitarian emergencies.  They also undermine efforts to promote democracy and good 
governance (Wyler 2007).  Extremist organizations thrive in these conditions, as 
evidenced by Somalia and Afghanistan, and generally move quickly to fill the power 
vacuum left by the dissolution of the state.  External powers such as the United States or 
the United Nations find it in their best interest to restore stability in these countries to 
counter the perceived threats that a failed state may create (Rotberg 2004).   
While the use of external forces to stabilize a nation is initially unavoidable, the 
transfer to indigenous security forces is necessary to re-establish local governance and 
stability (Jones, et al., 2005).  The time required to develop these indigenous forces drive 
economic, political and military decisions for the failed state and the external powers 
involved.  The ability to identify recruiting needs and how to control the force’s growth 
provides leaders with an understanding of the challenges facing a new Army.   
The need to develop national security forces in Afghanistan became a major 
concern for the United States following the defeat of the Taliban in 2002 (Manuel and 
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Singer 2002).  Initially, the United States intended to build an 18,000-man army in 18 
months to relieve the strain from International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).  By 
January of 2005, the ANA had grown to 17,800 soldiers with 3,000 in training.  As the 
Taliban become more active in Afghanistan, ISAF revisited the size of the ANA and in 
December of 2008, the ANA reached 80,000 soldiers and plans to grow to 134,000 
soldiers (Afghan National Army 2009). 
To manage this growth, U.S. Army analysts developed a model to determine the 
promotion rates necessary for the sustained growth of the ANA (MacCalman and Benson 
2008).  This model has a narrow focus and allows for the manipulation of the current 
strength and desired end strength.  SFGM, with the addition of features found in manning 
models such as Gibson (2008), Schrews (2002), and Clark (2009), significantly enhances 
this prior work.   
More specifically, the work of MacCalman and Benson focuses force growth at a 
monthly level.  Typically, models for officer growth such as Gibson (2007) and Yamada 
(2000) are year-based, focusing on annual growth and large personnel movements.  This 
is similar to enlisted corps models where Ginther (2006) and Rodgers (1991) determine 
growth requirements on an annual basis.  The level of fidelity required in developing a 
new army is much finer.  Annual values do not provide sufficient information to manage 
month-to-month growth, promotion, and retention.  For this reason, SFGM manages 
force growth using a monthly period initially and converting to a yearly period later in 
the planning horizon.  This allows us to see the effects of the initial period of growth on 
long-term force development. 
The officer corps development in SFGM is similarly unique.  Where in most 
militaries the enlisted corps provides a small part of the officer corps, in an emerging 
state the pool for commissioned officers draws primarily from the enlisted ranks.  This 
causes a significant impact on growth not only for the officer corps, but for the enlisted 
corps as well.  Essentially, an additional separation factor is acting on the enlisted ranks, 
while the officers corps sustained growth is dependent on an uninterrupted flow of 
soldiers.  This is not to say that recruitment does not occur, only that the recruitment 
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numbers are far too low to independently fill and grow the officer corps.  SFGM allows 
for this growth structure and accounts for it in the recruitment of enlisted soldiers. 
The existence of a legacy force creates additional challenges in the growth of the 
ANA.  The need for senior officers and NCOs to lead and manage a force are primary 
concerns.  In both Afghanistan and Iraq one method of filing these positions was the use 
of the legacy force, which is defined as the nation’s previous Army or members of 
organized militia groups.  When creating a new Army, these soldiers and officers may 
play a valuable role in establishing the new force.  SFGM allows for the inclusion of 
these personnel into the new force at some cost.  This method is similar to Schrews 
(2002) who examined the growth of the reserve force and the ability to bring in soldiers 
at any rank.   
A significant aspect of force growth is the control of enlisted and officer 
reenlistment to establish goals for the new force.   In previous manpower models 
reenlistment is fixed in attrition data.  This allows for reenlistment to occur as part of 
standard attrition at a specific level.  SFGM incorporates reenlistment as a separate 
variable that allows the model to determine the optimal reenlistment rates within lower 
and upper bounds.     
 Addressing the problem of growing a new military for an emerging state is 
complicated by the short time available and the intricacies of its force generation.  
Dealing with these issues requires the combination of the enlisted personnel models and 
officer models and the implementation of new ideas for personnel growth.  SFGM works 
to bring these aspects together to develop a coherent strategy for recruiting and growing 
the desired force.  
C. PROBLEM STATEMENT AND THESIS OUTLINE 
This thesis develops a linear program to assist in the development of national 
security forces over an unknown (infinite) time horizon.  SFGM prescribes monthly and 
annual targets for recruitment, promotions, accessions, reenlistments, and retirements.  
Chapter II discusses a model that was previously used to advise on promotions for the 
ANA and for similar papers.  Chapter III presents the SFGM.  Chapter IV discusses 
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SFGM implementation and the results.  Chapter V provides conclusions and areas of 
future research.  Appendix A presents the primal equilibrium approximation for SFGM 
over an infinite horizon.  Appendix B presents the dual equilibrium approximation for 
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II.  SECURITY FORCE GROWTH 
 Establishing security involves domestic security, secure borders, 
and relatively  accommodating neighbors.  Of the three factors in 
achieving stabilization and reconstruction, domestic security is the most 
important and often the most difficult to achieve. 
James Stephenson 
Losing the Golden Hour: An Insider’s View of Iraq’s Reconstruction 
 
A. AN OVERVIEW OF MILITARY FORCE GENERATION 
Military manpower planning has a long history in its impact on managing and 
growing armies.  From the Roman Legions to today’s militaries, some form of manpower 
planning was necessary for their growth and management.  Manpower planning as it is 
known today was first reported following the second world war by Seal (1945) and Vadja 
(1947) in published works on hierarchical organizations.  As the Allied victory over the 
Axis became an eventuality, the United Kingdom asked Seal and Vadja to develop plans 
for the reconstruction of the Royal Navy’s technical and managerial civilian manpower 
structures.  Seal’s and Vadja’s work became the foundation for modern manpower 
modeling.  By 1960, manpower planning became a part of military force management as 
the United Kingdom and the U.S. shifted away from conscription armies (Smith and 
Bartholomew 1988).  
Today, manpower models inform all aspects of force growth and development 
decisions in the U.S. Armed Services.  The services use separate models to determine 
enlisted and officer recruiting requirements, promotion rates, retirement thresholds, and 
transitions within the organization.  These models all have common attributes: 
hierarchical structures, fixed entry points, managed transitions and sustained attrition 
rates.  In general, current military manpower models focus on either the enlisted force 
growth, such as Ginther (2006), Rodgers (1991) and Schrews (2002), or on officer 




to identify any models that focus on the growth of the complete organization, as the 
separation of the models by rank is a natural result of the separate populations within the 
military. 
Emerging states have a different set of force generation issues.  The initial 
recruitment is problematic and the pool of qualified candidates to serve as officers is 
limited as seen in Iraq and Afghanistan (Haims, et al., 2008).  There likely exists some 
previous military organization that the new government may not want to completely 
include in the new force, but does provide a pool from which to draw in limited 
quantities.  Management of the force requires a high level of fidelity to allow planners to 
understand the near term needs of the force.  This near-term focus must then transition to 
an extended horizon to determine the force’s long-term needs to attain a desired end-
state.   
To answer this problem, U.S. Army analysts developed a heuristic model to 
determine the monthly promotion rates necessary to sustain force growth in the ANA 
(MacCalman and Benson 2008).  This is an Excel-based, time-step model that seeks to 
find the optimal solution by conducting a binary search over the solution space.  
Recruitment and attrition targets are set and the model returns the size of the force at time 
p and the associated number of promotions for each rank r in that period.  This model 
does not account for losses due to contract expiration or voluntary and forced retirement.  
The model allows a set number of gains from the legacy force as opposed to a variable 
rate dependent on the force’s actual needs.  It also does not account for the interaction 
between enlisted and officer growth.   
In a more detailed account of ANA force generation, Benson (2008) discusses the 
specific aspects of developing the heuristic force generation model.  Benson uses the 
Runge-Kutta 4 method to solve a dynamical system of equations and implements it in 
Excel.  Runge-Kutta 4 is a step-based method for solving ordinary differential equations 
where it treats each step in the sequence in an identical manner to the previous step and 
does not use the prior behavior of the solution in the next step of the process (Press, et al., 
1995).  Benson’s model provides monthly fidelity on promotion rates for the growing 
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force; however, it maintains separate enlisted and officer personnel models that prevent 
observation of the interaction between their respective growths. 
B. MANAGING FORCE GROWTH 
We manage force growth at the personnel level and at the organizational level.  At 
the personnel level, movement through an organization occurs in three phases: accession, 
promotion, and separation.  Each of these phases provides force managers multiple 
methods that allow them to control the growth of the force.  Organizationally, we manage 
the force with regard to the desired end-state by controlling the size of the final force and 
the required rank ratios.  It is necessary to understand each of these levels and the second 
and third order effects that growth decisions may cause in the months or years to come.     
1. Accessions 
Accession is a military term used to describe recruitment of a person into the 
organization.  Accession of enlisted soldiers occurs through basic training where recruits 
are selected from some pool of personnel that fill the needs of the force.  In general, the 
pool of available recruits for the enlisted corps is large and able to meet the force 
demand.  Recruitment of the enlisted force is constrained only by the size of the training 
facilities available to process new recruits.  Those completing basic training and entering 
the force enter at the lowest grade. 
We draw officer accessions from a smaller, more educated pool from the 
population at large and from the existing enlisted force.  Afghanistan suffers from the 
lack of an educated class and is incapable of providing sufficient recruits to fill officer 
positions (Haims, et al., 2008).  However, as the enlisted corps is established, enlisted 
soldiers who excel in leadership positions can be accessed to the officer corps.  The 
maximum officer candidate training capacity constrains the total number of officers 
accessed to the maximum that can be trained in a period.  Those completing officer 
training enter the force at the lowest officer rank. 
SFGM may also access soldiers to both the officer and enlisted corps from a 
separate, previously existing pool allowing senior level positions to be filled without 
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rapid promotion of junior officers (Chan 2009).  The legacy force provides accessions 
directly into any rank within the new forces structure.  Depending on the political climate 
surrounding the growth of the new force, these legacy elements might not be welcomed.   
2. Promotions 
Promotions are the advancement in rank for a soldier from their current grade to 
the next higher grade.  SFGM incorporates upper and lower bounds on promotion rates to 
ensure that promotions fall within reasonable rates according to force size.  Where 
Gibson (2008) incorporates the Below Zone (BZ) and Above Zone (AZ) decision 
variable, SFGM allows promotion of a soldier between the minimum required time in 
grade and their retention control point.   
3. Separations 
Separation refers to soldiers leaving the force.  SFGM allows soldiers to leave in a 
number of different ways: attrition, End of Term of Service (ETS), retention control, and 
retirement.  We use attrition to describe the loss of soldiers during their period of service 
to any number of reasons such as administrative separation, desertion, or combat losses.  
These unprogrammed losses occur independent of force growth and control measures.  
We measure attrition as a percentage of the force per period.  Both the Iraqi Army and the 
Afghan Army endured periods of significantly high attrition, near 50 percent during the 
initial growth of their organization.  Over time, the attrition rates fell to approximately 3 
percent annually for both (Metz and Millen 2005; Government Accountability Office 
(GAO) 2005). 
The next method of separation is when a soldier reaches their ETS.  Afghan 
soldiers enlist for a tour of duty of three years for enlisted soldiers and five years for 
NCOs; promotions from one grade to another incur a new tour of duty.  When a soldier 
reaches the expiration of their contract, they reenlist and serve another tour of duty or 
they choose to leave the service.  SFGM’s lower and upper bounds on reenlistment 
reflect the current reenlistment rates in Afghanistan (GAO 2008).   
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Retention control is the involuntary separation of a soldier who has surpassed the 
authorized time in grade.  Soldiers in this category depart the force inventory in the next 
period.   
Retirement allows for the removal of senior officers and NCOs from the inventory 
to allow junior officers and NCOs continued forward progression.                   
4. Organizational 
The simplest control factor at the organizational level is the desired end strength.  
This factor provides the goal against which we measure solutions to determine their 
sufficiency.  The second organizational control factor is the force ratio.  Each rank has a 
target force ratio, which is that rank’s percentage of the force’s end strength.  Failure to 
manage force ratio could result in a large inventory of enlisted coupled with a small 
inventory of officers that would create a poorly managed, ineffective organization.  
Together end strength and the force ratio decisions drive promotion, accession, and 
separation decisions.  
C. RELATED LITERATURE 
The SFGM is different from standard personnel models in four ways: it combines 
the growth of the enlisted and officer corps into a single model; it plans force growth over 
an infinite horizon; it provides a variable time planning horizon with monthly and annual 
fidelity; and it incorporates the growth of the force through standard recruitment, a legacy 
force, and enlisted accessions.  We focus on three areas of past, related manpower 
research: hierarchical models, personnel management, and infinite time horizons.   
1. Hierarchical Models 
Most organizations are hierarchical in structure and the military is no exception.  
An extensive literature exists with focus on managing manpower planning in 
organization or on specific aspects of manpower planning in the hierarchy.  Edwards 
(1983) provides a useful survey of manpower models and discusses the three needs of a 
manpower model: data on current stock, data on wastage (attrition), and data on inflow 
recruits.  Hierarchical organizations exhibit two separate forms of growth: cohort and 
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renewal.  Vadja (1978) discusses the growth of organizations using a cohort model and 
Markovian transition matrices.  Members enter the organization as groups, advance 
through the rank structure, and attrite according to some survival function.  Renewal is a 
recruitment theory that dictates growth to maintain a current state.  The attrition of the 
current force and their promotion drives the inflow of the organization (Bartholomew, 
Forbes and McClean 1991).  The structure of SFGM results in recruiting that follows 
both forms, as SFGM initially generates the force and then stabilizes it at its desired end 
strength.   
Mehlmann (1980) uses a Markov chain to optimize recruitment and grade 
transition.  Mehlmann shows that using dynamic programming over a finite horizon 
provides optimal strategies based on a present state.  Morgan (1979) shows that optimal 
recruiting levels may be detrimental to overall organizational health.  Morgan argues that 
to achieve some desired steady state promotion rate, sub-optimal recruiting may be 
necessary to prevent bulges in manpower that affect upward mobility.  This is a 
significant insight into tracking the promotion and recruitment in SFGM.  SFGM initially 
focuses on maximizing recruiting to reach the desired end strength, similar to Mehlmann, 
and on promotion constraints to provide a stable long-term force, similar to Morgan.   
The Army Manpower Long-Range Planning System (MLRPS) is a long horizon 
manpower planning model that determines promotions, accessions, losses and 
reclassification for the Army (Gass, et al., 1988).  MLRPS determines manpower goals 
over a 7 to 20 year planning horizon.  Unlike most models, MLRPS handles both officer 
and enlisted growth, however, it models each separately.  MLRPS minimizes a weighted 
sum of the deviations from the target values as an objective function.  Gass finds that 
achieving objectives for promotions, separations, and accessions conflict with each other, 
and without elastic variables would be infeasible (Gass, et al., 1988). 
2. Personnel Management 
We typically model personnel management separately for officers or enlisted.  We 
examine the literature and models used with each. 
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a. Officer Management 
Gibson (2007) develops the Total Army Competitive Category 
Optimization Model (TACCOM), a linear program, to determine accession requirements 
and promotion rates over a forty-year period.  TACCOM specifically focuses on below 
the zone, primary zone and above zone promotions and their impact on officer strength.  
SFGM extends the above zone and below zone promotions developed in Gibson and 
incoporates them as piece-wise linear functions.   
Corbett (1995) develops a linear program to determine the number of 
officer accessions required to manage the U.S. Army’s junior and mid-level officer 
needs. Corbett specifically focuses on the management of officers between the combat 
arms and the combat support branches of the U.S. Army.  His model optimizes the 
assignment of officers between the branches to provide the number of officers necessary 
at each grade.  The purpose of the model is to identify the number of accessions and 
branch details necessary to manage the mid-level officers required later in the planning 
horizon.   
Clark (2009) develops the Requirements-Driven Costs-Based Manpower 
Optimization (RCMOP) linear program to determine monthly values for promotion, 
inventory, accessions, natural losses and forced losses by minimizing the total penalty for 
deviations from manpower requirements.  RCMOP optimizes over a two year time 
horizon on a monthly basis to meet the fiscal requirements of the U.S. Navy.  Other than 
SFGN, RCMOP’s is the only other example of a monthly fidelty military manpower 
linear program that we encountered.     
b. Enlisted Management 
The U.S. Army’s initial efforts to model the growth of the force used the 
Enlisted Loss Inventory Model—Computation of Manpower Programs using Linear 
Programs (ELIM-COMPLIM).  ELIM-COMPLIM is a linear program that forecasts 
strengths, gains, and losses over a seven-year period (Holz and Wroth 1980).  ELIM 
focuses on the expected losses from the enlisted inventory and then determines the 
necessary accessions to maintain the desired force strength.  The Accession Supply 
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Costing and Requirements (ASCAR) model is a successor to ELIM that forecasts the 
costs of optimizing the accession of new soldiers of different types into the force 
(Collins, Gass and Rosendahl 1983).  Where ELIM is a near-term policy model that 
determines personnel objectives, ASCAR models the long-term impact of personnel 
requirements, personnel qualification, and types of recruits.         
Another model developed to manage the growth of a hierarchical 
organization is the Total Army Personnel Lifecycle Model (TAPLIM).  It is a linear 
program that develops near term strategic personnel planning by minimizing the total 
absolute deviation from a desired target (Durso and Donahue 1995).  TAPLIM managed 
the downbuild of the U.S. Army following the end of the Cold War and determined the 
necessary mixture of active duty and reserve soldiers to meet the Army’s strategic 
objectives.   
Rodgers (1991) uses a multi-objective linear program to manage enlisted 
strength planning for the Navy.  The model determines monthly inventories, 
advancement, and recruiting goals over a multi year period.  Rodger’s model incorporates 
budgetary and organizational constraints and seeks to minimize the total deviation from 
the desired end-state.   
Ginther (2006) develops the Army Reserve Enlisted Aggregate Flow 
Model (AREAFM), which is a Markov growth model.  AREAFM provides specific 
recruiting requirements based on aggregate accession, attrition, and retention rates.  
Rodgers and Ginther provided insight into enlisted manpower modeling and management 
of retention rates in SFGM. 
Schrews (2002) develops the Active Guard Reserve Enlisted Manpower 
Projection Model (AGR EMPM), an enlisted reserve manpower linear program to 
determine the long term effects of preventing critical career fields from leaving the 
reserves, and of accessing senior enlisted soldiers directly into the force.  Specifically, the 
model determines the impact on accessions and promotions that these policies would 
have.  Schrews’ model incorporates accessions directly into the ranks of E7 and below 
from a recruiting base or from the active Army.  This differs from most military 
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manpower models where the force pyramid is entered solely from the base.  AGR EMPM 
was initially conceived to optimize the manpower decisions on a monthly basis over a 
seven year horizon.  However, Schrews found the model size intractable and switched to 
model decisions on a yearly basis.         
3.  Infinite Time Horizons 
When dealing with multi-period optimization, one area of concern is the end of 
the planning horizon.  Manpower models are specifically designed for some short period 
of time, such as Holz (1980) which planned over a seven year horizon, but are actually 
modeling a system that extends out to some unknown (infinite) horizon.  The artificial 
horizon, or truncation, may have effects on the optimal solution as it ignores variables 
that would continue to influence the solution beyond the planning horizon.  These 
variations are end effects first discussed explicitly in Grinold (1983).  Grinold suggests 
four methods for dealing with end effects: truncation, salvage, and primal and dual 
equilibrium.  Truncation ignores the stable phase following the predetermined horizon, 
while the salvage technique places some value on the decisions from the period prior to 
the final period into the future.  Finally, the primal and dual equilibrium impose an 
equilibrium constraint on the stable phase that accounts for penalties that would accrue 
over the infinite horizon.   
Schochetman (1989) proves that primal and dual equilibrium converge to an 
infinite horizon where optimality is assured.  Additionally, Schochetman discusses 
optimal solution sets and the stopping criteria for infinite horizon problems and 
determines that policy based stopping criteria are preferred over convergence, as 
convergence in value tends to be slow.  SFGM incorporates a policy-based stopping 
criterion at period 50 rather than at convergence; convergence of the SFGM primal, dual, 
and truncation occurs near period 160 and is beyond any reasonable planning period. 
Walker (1995) provides methods for implementing infinite horizon optimization 
for linear and integer programs where similar decisions need to be made repeatedly over 
many successive periods, and specifically discusses implementation of primal and dual 
equilibrium with respect to personnel models.  In particular, Walker extended the horizon 
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of the Army Manpower Model, TAPLIM, using both dual and primal equilibrium models 
to establish bounds on the optimal infinite time horizon solution.  Using these bounding 
methods Walker generates a tight bound, within one percent, on the optimal solution.   
Yamada (2000) develops an Infinite Horizon Manpower Planning model (IHMP) 
to determine the annual number of accession, promotions, and separations necessary for 
the Army to manage the officer corps.  IHMP is a convex quadratic program that uses 
both the dual and primal equilibrium to bind the optimal solution to the Army’s officer 
growth problem.  Walker (1995) and Yamada (2000) provide the basis for the SFGM 
infinite horizon model; SFGM differs in that it incorporates two time period indices as 
opposed to one. 




III. MODEL FORMULATION 
A. MODELING ASSUMPTIONS 
In the immortal words of George Box “All models are wrong, but some are 
useful.”  We develop three SFGM models to account for end effects (Grinold 1983). Here 
we present the truncation model as it is the basis for both the dual and the primal 
equilibrium models.  The following are assumptions for all three models. 
1. Promotions result in incurring a service obligation for NCOs of five years.  
This assumption simplifies reenlistment. 
2. To allow for flexibility, many SFGM constraints are elastic.  An elastic 
constraint allows for violation at a cost per unit violation.  We show elastic 
constraints with ≤o  (e.g., Brown, Dell and Wood 1997). 
3. SFGM assumes that force managers desire smooth promotions, 
recruitment, and accessions.  This smoothing prevents large fluctuations 
from period to period.  
4. SFGM incorporates two separate time epochs.  Monthly periods for the 
first three critical years of growth and annual periods at the start of the 
fourth year.  These two epochs allow detailed monthly modeling of the 
short term, rapid growth of the ANA during the first three years and then 
avoid unnecessary monthly detail beyond year three. 
Figures 1, 2 and 3 illustrate the flow of enlisted and officers through their career 














Figure 1.   Enlisted Career Path Shown as a Network (E1 to E6)   
Figure 1 shows the career path progression of an enlisted soldier.  We 
group E1s through E4s as skill level one soldiers.  Recruitment for the 
force occurs at this grade as does the first opportunity for legacy force 
soldiers to join the current force.  Soldiers depart each node by promotion, 
separation, or accession to the officer corps.  We limit accessions to the 











Figure 2.   Enlisted Career Path Shown as a Network (E7 to E9) 
Figure 2 shows the career path progressions for soldiers in the rank of E7 
to E9.  Soldiers enter each rank in one of two ways: promotion, or from 
the legacy force.  The rank of E7 is the final rank where a soldier is 
available for accession to the officer corps.  Soldiers depart the ranks 
through either separation or promotion, with the exception of E9 where 









Figure 3.   Officer Career Progression in SFGM Shown through a Network 
Figure 3 shows the career progression of officers in SFGM from 
Lieutenant to Captain.  2nd and 1st Lieutenants are combined into one 
grade as the progression from one to another is typically dependent solely 
on time in service.  All officer Grades from O3 to O6 have equivalent 
force flows with the exception that we do not promote officers out of the 
rank of O6.  Legacy force soldiers are available for accession into all 
grades as needed to fill force requirement.  Officer recruits and accessions 
from the enlisted corps enter through the grade of lieutenant.  Officers 
depart their current grade through either promotion or separation.   
B. INPUT PARAMETERS 
1. Indices 
 , 'r r   rank {1,2,…,11} 
 p   periods in planning horizon {1,2,…,P} 
 , 't t   Time in Grade (TIG) in period {1,2,…,T} 
 
2. Sets 
 ,' p tt epoch∈   set of TIG measurement from one period length  
     to another (months to years)  
 ,r pt pw∈   set of TIG promotion periods for rank r at   
     period  p, changes from TIG in months to TIG in  
     years at transition point 
 ,r pt rw∈   TIG reenlistment window for rank r in period p  
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3. Data  
  ,r pα    discount rate for rank r at period p [UNITS] 
,r paccess   maximum fraction of officer accession per rank r in  
   period p
Soldiers Accessed
Total Soldiers
⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦  
,r pattrite    fraction of rank r attriting at the beginning of  
   period p 
Soldiers  Attrited in Period 
Total Soldiers  in Period 
r p
r p
⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦  
,r tcurrent    initial number of soldiers in rank r at time in grade  
   t [soldiers] 
rexisting    number of soldiers in rank r available from legacy  
   force [soldiers] 
,,
, r pr pfrac frac   fraction of soldiers of rank r desired at period p 
   
Soldiers of rank 
Total Soldiers
r⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦  
,r pfracL    
fraction of legacy force soldiers allowed per rank r  
   per period p [ soldiers]
 
 
potc     
officer training capacity for period p [ soldiers]
 
,,
, r pr pprom prom  minimum and maximum promotion for rank r at the 
beginning of period p [number of soldiers] 
,, , r pr prec rec   minimum and maximum number of recruits of rank 
 r at the beginning of month p [soldiers] 
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,r pretire   maximum retirement for rank r in period p   
   [soldiers] 
,,
, r pr preup reup  minimum and maximum fraction of reenlistment  
   per rank r 
Soldiers who Reenlist
Soldiers Eligible to Reenlist
⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦  
,, , r pr psab sab    minimum and maximum fraction of accession for 
 each rank r between periods p  
,,
, r pr pspb spb    minimum and maximum fraction promotions for 
 each rank r between periods  p 
,, , r pr psrb srb    minimum and maximum fraction recruitment for 
 each rank r between  periods p  
,r rtarget target   targeted number of soldiers in rank r  
,,
, r pr ptig tig    minimum and maximum time in grade per rank r 
 for promotion  in period p[periods] 
  
 tgt   Point at which time shifts from monthly to yearly 
  
 propoint  Desired point where promotion occurs 
 
C. VARIABLES  
, ,r p tACS   accessed Soldier for rank r 1 to 5 in TIG t at the beginning of  
  period p [soldiers]  
, ,r p tETS  end time of service for rank r in TIG t at the beginning of period  
  p [soldiers] 
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,r pHDO  number of legacy soldiers in rank r to add to the force at the  
  beginning of period p  [soldiers]  
, ,r p tPRO  soldiers promoted from rank r at the beginning of period p at time 
in grade t [soldiers] 
,r pREC  number of recruits of rank r added at the beginning of period p  
  [soldiers] 
, ,r p tRET  retirement number for rank r at the beginning of period p at time in 
grade t [soldiers] 
, ,r p tX    number of rank r at the beginning of period p at time in grade t  
  [soldiers] 
D. MODEL FORMULATION EQUATIONS  
1. Balance of Flow Equations 
 , , , ,                                                            , 1,r p t r t r pX current HDO r p t= + ∀ =  (1.1) 
 
 , , , ,                                                     1, 1, 1r p t r p r pX REC HDO r p t= + ∀ = > =  (1.2) 
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2. Constraints 
a.   Accession Constraints 
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ACS access X r p
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c.  Force Growth Constraints 
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d.   Force Sizing Constraints 
 ,
, ,                                                             , 1
r p
r p t rr
t tig
target X target r p
≤
≤ ≤ ∀ >∑o o  (1.18)  
 
 , , ,
', , , , ', ,,,
' '
                 , 1
r p r p r p
r p t r p t r p tr pr p
r rt tig t tig t tig
frac X X frac X r p
≤ ≤ ≤
≤ ≤ ∀ >∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑o o  (1.19) 
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3. Objective Function 
 
minimize                                                                             penalties  (1.20) 
 
Where the priorities are: 
• Meet the required number of soldiers at each rank 
• Meet the required proportion for each rank 
• Penalize early and late promotion of soldiers  
• Smooth the rate of promotion, recruitment, and accessions  
• Focus on building new forces as opposed to incorporating older forces. 
E.  MODEL EXPLANATION 
1. Objective Function 
The objective function (1.20) seeks to minimize the total weighted deviation from 
the desired force size at the given time horizon.  We discount the penalties to provide 
greater importance to decisions made earlier in the planning horizon.   
2.   Constraints 
a. Balance of Flow 
The balance of flow equations track the initial size and the total growth of 
the overall force.  Constraints (1.1) establish the initial force size of the ANA and 
distribute the existing force by rank and TIG.   
Constraints  (1.2) and (1.3) track the creation of new soldiers and officers 
respectively.  Constraints (1.2) are for soldiers of rank one with a TIG of one (the sum of 
recruits and legacy force soldiers brought into the ANA).  Constraints (1.3) track officers 
of rank seven with TIG one (soldiers from the previous period who were accessed, 
officers who were recruited, and officers from the legacy force).   
Constraints (1.4) track soldiers, NCOs and officers as they progress by 
rank and TIG from one period to the next by accession, promotions, and ETS.  
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Constraints (1.5) are a version of constraints (1.4) for senior NCOs and COLs whose 
monthly strength is a function of only normal attrition and retirement.   
Constraints (1.6) track the NCOs and officers entering a new grade with a 
time in grade of one.  
b.   Accession Constraints 
To control accessions we use constraint sets (1.7), (1.8) and (1.9).  We 
track the total number of accessions that occur in a single period with constraints (1.7).  
Constraints (1.8) limit the total number of accessions in a period to the training slots 
available.  Constraints (1.9) restrict upward swings in accession rates.    
c.  Promotions 
Constraint sets (1.10) and (1.11) constrain promotion.  Constraints (1.10) 
allow the total number of promotions to fall between upper and lower bounds by rank and 
period.  Constraints (1.11) restrict unpenalized promotion rates.  
d. Force Growth 
Constraints (1.12) limit the total number of soldiers available from the 
legacy force.  Constraints (1.13) restrict the number of soldiers from the legacy force for 
a given period to a percentage of the number promoted into that rank in the same period.   
Constraints (1.14) ensure that the number of recruits in a period falls 
within a minimum and maximum.  Constraints (1.15) prevent large shifts in recruitment.    
Constraint sets (1.16) and (1.17) constrain losses.  Constraints (1.16) 
restrict the number of retirements that occur in a period.  Constraints (1.17) control the 
rate at which soldiers ETS from the ANA.   
e. Force Sizing 
Constraints (1.18) constrain the size of the force to an upper and lower 
limit.  Constraints (1.19) constrain the ratio of each rank to the total force.    
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3. Elastic Implementation 
SFGM incorporates elastic variables to allow for flexibility in growing the ANA.  
Elastic variables allow for violation of constraints at a penalty per unit violation.  We 
present the penalties, elastic variables (with constraint identification), and  
their incorporation in the objective function.   
a. Penalty Parameters 
,r ppexisting   penalty for using legacy soldiers of rank r in period p  
rpvar    Penalty for varying from the desired rank ratio for   
 soldiers of rank r  
rprec   penalty for exceeding the desired number of recruits for  
 soldiers of rank r  
rpacc   penalty for exceeding the desired accession rate for   
 soldiers of rank r  
,r ppsA    penalty for varying accession from the smoothing function 
 for rank r in period p  
,r ppsP    penalty for varying promotion from the smoothing function 
 for rank r in period p 
,r ppsR    penalty for varying recruitment from the smoothing 
 function for rank r in period p 
 pgoal   penalty for violating desired Target Values 
, ,r p tppro   penalty for promotions in rank r in period p TIG t occuring 
 below minimum TIG or above the desired TIG  
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b. Elastic Variables 
pACC    number of officers over the maximum number of   
    accessions allowed in a period p [soldiers] 
  Equation (1.7) 
,r pDA   number of accession of rank r at the beginning of period p  
    over the maximum allowed [soldiers] 
  Equation (1.8) 
,r pDGU  number of rank r over the desired level at the beginning of  
    period p [soldiers] 
  Equation (1.18) 
,r pDGD  number of rank r below the desired level at the beginning  
    of period p [soldiers] 
  Equation (1.18) 
,r pDREC  number of recruits of rank r over the maximum allowed at  
    the beginning of period p [soldiers] 
  Equation (1.14) 
,r pDOWN  number of soldiers rank r below the required ratio at the  
    beginning of period p [soldiers] 
  Equation (1.19) 
,r pUP    number of soldiers rank r above the required rank ratio at  
    the beginning of period p [soldiers] 
  Equation (1.19) 
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,r pSA   number of accessions for soldiers in rank r over period p  
    greater than or less than the minimum or maximum number 
    of accessions from the previous period[soldiers] 
  Equation (1.9) 
,r pSP   number of promotions for soldiers in rank r over period p  
    greater than or less than the minimum or maximum number 
    of promotions from the previous period[soldiers] 
  Equation (1.11) 
,r pSR   number of recruits in rank r over period p greater than or  
    less than the minimum or maximum number of recruits  
    from the previous period[soldiers] 
  Equation (1.15) 
c.   Objective Function 
We now present the objective function that explicitly shows the elastic 
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IV. ANALYSIS OF MODEL RESULTS 
We implement SFGM using a 2.4 GHz Dual Core windows based personal 
computer running the General Algebraic Modeling System (GAMS) (GAMS 
Development Corporation 2001) and the free, open source Computational Infrastructure 
for Operations Research Branch and Cut (CBC) solver (Forrest 2005).  GAMS is 
interfaced through Microsoft Excel, which provides an input platform for data. 
We implement the SFGM Dual Equilibrium to solve the growth of the ANA.  A 
typical instance is 100,000 variables, 50,000 constraints with 1.8 million non-zero 
elements.  Total solution time is 10 minutes for a 15-year planning horizon (36 monthly 
periods followed by 12 annual periods).  
A. MODEL IMPLEMENTATION 
SFGM uses a number of parameters (Table 1) allowing for manipulation of a 
planning scenario in many different ways.  We define parameters separately for each rank 
to provide greater control of force management.  Each rate in Table is at a monthly level 
with integer values indicating personnel numbers, such as current and end strength, or 
specific times such as maximum and minimum TIG. Table 1 provides the baseline values 
for SFGM from which we draw each succeeding scenario.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
Attrition Rate 0.0013 0.0013 0.0013 0.0013 0.0013 0.0013 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005
Accession Rate 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.017 0 0 0 0 0 0
Current Strength 40635 15410 8155 5584 1900 580 2978 3271 2620 1440 422
End Strength 65604 24880 13166 9015 3067 936 4808 5281 4231 2325 682
Rank Ratio 0.490 0.186 0.098 0.067 0.023 0.007 0.036 0.039 0.032 0.017 0.005
Legacy Force 0 0 0 0 0 0 500 700 500 400 50
Minimum Promotion Rate 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 N/A 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 N/A
Maximum Promotion Rate 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 N/A 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 N/A
Minimum TIG (Promotion) 24 24 36 36 48 0 24 36 36 48 0
Promotion Point 30 30 40 40 50 0 30 40 40 50 0
Maximum TIG 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120
Minimum Recruitment 1400 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 20 N/A N/A N/A N/A
Maximum Recruitment 2400 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 50 N/A N/A N/A N/A
Retirements 0 0 0 0.005 0.01 0.01 0 0 0.005 0.01 0.01
Minimun Reenlistment Rate 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 1 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.7 1




Table 1.   SFGM Parameters 
Table 1 shows the default parameters for SFGM.  We display all 
parameters in monthly values.    
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1. Data 
a. Attrition Rates 
SFGM attrites the force according to a fixed rate.  We set this to a monthly 
enlisted attrition rate of 0.13 percent  (annual 1.56 percent) and monthly officer attrition 
rate of  0.05 percent (annual 0.6 percent)(Radin 2009). 
b. Accession Rates 
There is no specific information regarding historic accession rates 
(number of enlisted soldiers available for accession in a given period); we set the upper 
bound to 1.7 percent (annual 20 percent) of the available enlisted corps, with a lower 
bound of 0.       
c. Current Strength 
The current strength of the force is the starting point from which the force 
is grown.  We initialize the force strength at the current manning level of the ANA, 
82,000.  The total number by rank in the current force is available (Table 1) but the 
distribution of these soldiers in TIG is not as well defined.  SFGM assumes a linear 
distribution of soldiers across time in grade, with the largest number in TIG 1 to no 
soldiers beyond seven years TIG because 2002 was the first year of recruitment into the 
ANA (Jalali 2002).     
d. End Strength 
The target inventory in SFGM is the stated goal of an ANA end strength 
of 134,000 (Carden 2009) with its distribution by ranks shown in Table 1.  A secondary 
aspect of target inventory is the rank ratio for the force.  We determine rank ratio by 
dividing the end strength of each rank over the total end strength of the force.        
e. Legacy Force 
The legacy force (holdovers) is the total number of soldiers available from 
either militias or the previous army for each rank.  There is no complete accounting for 
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the number of former mujahedin or militia fighters, we establish a total upper bound of 
8,000 and establish limits by rank (Table 1). 
f. Promotion Rates 
Promotion rates establish the upper and lower limit on forward 
advancement for each rank.  Promotion becomes more difficult as soldiers move up the 
organization due to the decreasing size of the force.  We establish a monthly lower bound 
of zero and a monthly upper bound of three percent of each rank for promotions per 
period.  Promotions only occur without penalty for soldiers within a prescribed zone of 
promotion.  Each rank has a lower and upper TIG requirement on promotion and an ideal 
point, the “promotion point,” at which promotions should occur.   
Implementation of the promotion point creates a BZ, primary zone, and 
AZ region for each rank.  For example, Table 1 shows that the TIG required before a 
soldier in Rank 1 is eligible for promotion is between 24 months and 120 months.  We 
use a desired promotion point of 30 months.  SFGM allows early promotion of a soldier 
(TIG of 1 to 29 months) but the promotion incurs a penalty.  SFGM allows for a three-
year promotion window (TIG between 30 and 66), where there is no penalty for 
promotion.  Finally, a soldier promoted after TIG 66 would incur an increasing penalty 
the further they are from TIG 66.    
g. Recruitment Levels 
We bound recruitment levels to the present monthly throughput of the 
Kabul Military Training Center (KMTC).  The maximum number of soldiers produced 
monthly is 2,400 with a minimum of 1,400.  The maximum training throughput annually, 
with a surge capacity, is 40,000 with an average of 28,000 (Davis 2008).  SFGM recruits 
soldiers only into either Rank 1 (Soldier) or Rank 7 (Lieutenant).    
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h. Forced Retirement 
Retirement allows the force to open higher ranks to prevent stagnation.   
At most, 1 percent monthly (annually 12 percent) of the officers or NCOs in the highest 
three ranks are available for forced retirement.  A soldier is available for forced 
retirement at any TIG.   
i. Reenlistment Rates 
We bound reenlistment rates according to the most current upper and 
lower observed reenlistments in the ANA.  Presently, the upper reenlistment rate for 
enlisted soldiers is 50 percent with a lower bound of 20 percent Table 1 shows 
reenlistment rates for NCOs and officers.  We set the minimum ETS rate at 50 percent 
and a maximum rate of 80 percent.  We implement this each period by assessing soldiers 
who meet the ETS parameter for their rank.  For enlisted soldiers, the ETS variable exists 
when they are at a multiple of their 36-month TIG in the monthly portion or three years 
TIG in the annual portion.       
j. Time-in-Grade Maximums 
TIG maximum is the absolute longest a soldier may remain in a single 
rank.  Once a soldier reaches that point, they depart the force.  SFGM sets an upper 
bound of 10 years in any one rank.   
k. Time Horizons   
SFGM incorporates two separate time epochs; monthly periods for the 
first three critical years of growth and annual periods at the start of the fourth year.  These 
two epochs allow detailed monthly modeling of the short term to manage the rapid 
growth of the ANA during the first three years and then avoid unnecessary monthly detail 
beyond year three.     
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l. Discount Rate 
To account for the importance of decisions made in the near term and 
reduce the impact of decisions late in the planning horizon, we use a discount factor of 
0.95 for all computations reported in this chapter.  Using a discount rate of 0.95, our 
decisions at year 14 have a 50 percent weight, meaning a violation of a constraint at year 
14 incurs half the cost.  We explore the effect of a lower discount factor (such as a 
discount factor of 0.8 where violations of constraints after the fourth year have a 50 
percent weight) and find there is no significant impact on the optimal solutions. 
B.  TRUNCATION, PRIMAL AND DUAL EQUILIBRIUM 
Implementation of a linear program, which seeks to optimize over part of an 
infinite horizon, can result in end effects as described by Grinold (1983) and Walker 
(1995).  The Truncation ignores all events that occur past its planning horizon, is a 
relaxation of the infinite horizon, and therefore provides a lower bound.  To overcome 
these effects we develop the Primal and Dual equilibrium.  The Primal and Dual 
equilibrium seek to approximate the infinite horizon that occurs at the end of the finite 
planning horizon.  The Primal equilibrium accomplishes this by fixing the values of the 
final decision for every period beyond a truncated planning horizon.  This structure is a 
restriction on the infinite horizon problem, resulting in the Primal equilibrium providing 
an upper bound for a given period.  Appendix A provides the mathematical formulation 
of the Primal equilibrium.  The Dual equilibrium aggregates the decisions made beyond a 
truncated planning horizon into an infinite sum and is a relaxation.  Appendix B provides 
the mathematical formulation of the Dual equilibrium and an example of the infinite sum.    
Implementation of the three models provides a basis for determining the horizon 
that provides results not influenced by end effects.  Due to the shift from a monthly to 
yearly structure, we evaluate the three models after all variables are present after period 
40.  Figure 4 shows the convergence of the Truncation, Primal, and Dual equilibriums 
over 120 periods (40 to 160).  From Figure 4 we identify which function closes on the 
optimal infinite horizon objective function at the earliest period.  Here, the Dual 
equilibrium closes to within 0.2 percent of the optimal value at period 50.  The Primal 
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Equilibrium reaches three percent of the optimal value at period 160, while at period 100 
the Truncation is within one percent of the optimal value.  From this information, the 
Dual equilibrium is the preferred model for SFGM when executed out to period 50.  The 
results provided over 50 periods from the Dual equilibrium provide information for 48 



























Figure 4.   Convergence of the Objective Function Values for the Truncation, Primal and 
Dual Equilibriums 
Convergence of the objective function values for the Truncation, Primal 
and Dual equilibrium.  We see that the Primal equilibrium is converging 
from infinity and at period 160 it is within three percent of the Dual 
equilibrium.  The truncation begins rising to converge with the Dual 
equilibrium and closes to within one percent at Period 100.  The Dual 
equilibrium is within 0.2 percent of its optimal value at period 50. 
C. SCENARIOS AND RESULTS 
We develop five primary scenarios to demonstrate SFGM.  Scenario 1 grows the 
ANA using the current recruitment capabilities, attrition rates, and legacy force.  Scenario 
2 restricts lower and upper bounds on promotions based on the means and standard 
deviations found in Scenario 1.  Scenario 3 excludes the legacy force.  Scenario 4  
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improves enlisted reenlistment rates from 50 percent to 70 percent at the beginning of the 
fourth year.  Scenario 5 includes no enlisted accessions and grows the officer corps with 
only recruitment and the legacy force.     
1. Overview of Results 
We present an overview of the results for each scenario with subsequent sections 
providing more details.  Scenario 1 indicates that maximum recruiting is necessary for 
two years to establish the enlisted corps promotion base.  The rapid promotions that 
accompany this growth are evident later as Rank 3 (Staff Sergeant) and Rank 4 (Sergeant 
First Class) experience sustained decreasing promotion rates.  In general, the promotion 
rates during the three-year buildup phase have large variations and would be nearly 
impractical to implement.  Despite this, both the enlisted and officer corps reach the 
desired end strength in 24 months.   
Scenario 2 indicates that greater control over promotion rates slows the total force 
growth by four months (the ANA meets its desired end strength in 28 months).  Scenario 
2 also indicates that the current size of the officer corps does not support long-term 
stability.  The number of officers in Rank 7 (Lieutenants), Rank 8 (Captains), and Rank 9 
(Majors) is effectively equal which results in an extremely low separation rate for Ranks 
7 and 8 (essentially no voluntary separation at either Rank 7 or Rank 8).          
Scenario 3 excludes legacy force soldiers, and we find it takes five years (two 
more than Scenario 1 to grow the officer corps).  An important aspect of this is the slow 
growth of the senior levels of the officer corps.  Inclusion of the legacy force injects 
officers directly into the three senior ranks of the ANA that reduces rapid promotions 
within the officer corps and provides additional stability at each rank.    
Scenario 4 shows that improvement of retention rates for enlisted soldiers has two 
significant effects: lowered promotion rates and lowered recruiting needs.  Promotion 
rates decreases because fewer departing soldiers require fewer replacements.  We make a 
similar argument for the resulting reduction in recruitment requirements.  Essentially, 
increased retention rates reduce the recruiting demand on the ANA by approximately 
4,000 soldiers annually. 
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By eliminating enlisted accessions, Scenario 5 shows the necessary increase in 
officer recruitment that occurs to meet the desired end strength.  At the present recruiting 
rate of 600 officers annually, the ANA does not meet its end strength without enlisted 
accessions.  By reducing officer promotion rates and increasing the initial recruitment to 
2,400 annually for two years and 1200 annually after that point, the ANA reaches its 
officer end strength in 28 months. 
2. Meeting Current ANA End Strength Requirements 
Our first scenario considers the growth of the ANA from its current strength of 
82,000 soldiers to its stated goal of 134,000 soldiers.  We establish our parameters based 
on the most current information available regarding the ANA (Table 1).  We report 48 
(15 years) of 50 periods, the first 36 periods are monthly, followed by 12 annual.  We 
omit the last two periods as they contain variables that represent an infinite sum.  
a. Analysis of Scenario 1 
Analysis of the results provides insight into the challenges facing the 
growth of the ANA.  Given the current recruitment capabilities, the ANA can meet the 
desired end strength in less than three years. Figure 5 shows the total force exceeds its 
end strength and slowly descend until it reaches a stable strength at year 10.  The enlisted 
corps achieves its desired strength in slightly less than two years, the officer corps will 
reach its end strength eight months after the enlisted force.  To achieve this, large scale 
recruitment is necessary during the initial two-year buildup.    Figure 6 and Figure 7 
indicate the recruitment and accessions necessary to meet and maintiain the desired end 


























Figure 5.   Scenario 1 15-year Growth of the ANA  
Figure 5 shows the growth of the ANA over a 15-year planning horizon.  
We see that the force achieves the desired enlisted strength in 23 months 
with the officers reaching their end strength in 31 months. 
Figure 5 indicates that the initial growth of the ANA enlisted corps  
requires KMTC to operate at its maximum of 2,400 recruits per month for two years,  
followed by approximately 18,000 soldiers annually.  Figure 5 provides insight into the 
recruitment needs to effectively grow the officer corps.  Recruitment for the officer corps 
remains at its maximum level throughout the planning horizon.  During the initial build 
up, the recruitment levels are high but fail to provide a sufficient number of officers for 
reasonable growth.  To fill this short fall, enlisted accessions during the initial year of 
growth are approximately double the number of officers recruited.  Accessions remain 
high as the officer corps stabilizes, in the annual period we see that enlisted accessions 
















































Figure 6.   Scenario 1 Enlisted Recruiting Requirements  
Figure 6 shows the recruiting needs for the ANA during the monthly build 
up  (years 1 to 3) and the annual periods (years 4 to 15) following.  We see 
that during the initial two years, the ANA requires maximum number of 
recruits possible to allow for its growth.  In the annual period, we see that 
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Figure 7.   Scenario 1 Lieutenant Recruiting Requirements  
Figure 7 shows the monthly and annual recruiting requirements for the 
ANA officer corps.  The recruitment level for both the monthly (years 1 to 
3) and annual periods (years 4 to 15) are at their maximum value, while 
accessions fluctuate significantly during the buildup and reach a high of 
600 a month during the annual period.   
Promotions are similarly affected by the initial rapid growth of the force.  
A result of this rapid growth is shifting promotion rates that impacts advancement 
opportunities into the future.  This shift is an example of the impacts of optimal recruiting 
on organizational growth as reported in Morgan (1979).  In this instance, the ANA’s 
rapid growth results in a force with unequal distribution across TIG.  The heavy 
concentration of soldiers in lower level ranks reduces promotion opportunities as the 
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force ages at the same rate.  The rapid promotions create a manpower bulge that slowly 
progresses through each rank limiting the number of promotions in and out of each rank.  
We see this specifically in Ranks 3 and 4 in the annual period.  
Here we consider the percentage of soldiers promoted in one rank with 
regard to the total number of soldiers in that rank. Figure 8 shows the promotion rates for 
Ranks 1 through 5  over the planning horizon; all display similar patterns during the 
initial buildup as the force attempts to grow to meet the manning and force ratio 
requirements.  For soldiers in Rank 1 (Soldier), 2 (Sergeant), and 3 (SSG) a large surge in 
promotions with rates up to three  percent  per month during the first year preceeds a lull 
as the population of soldiers availabe for promotion is exhausted and promotion rates fall 
to between one percent and 0.5 percent per month.  Rank 4 and 5 (Master Sergeant) 
promotion rates grow slowly during the initial monthly buildup and then slowly decrease 
to 0.5 percent.  In the annual period, Ranks 3 and 4 show decreasing promotion rates; 
from 17 percent to 10 percent for Rank 3 and 11 percent to six percent for Rank 4.  Ranks 
1, 2 and 5 show relativley stable promotion rates throughout the annual period with Rank 
1 approximately seven percent, Rank 2’s promotion rate is stable at 12 percent, and Rank 
5 is stable at 0.6 percent.  This is a direct result of the large growth in the previous three 
years.  The two Ranks with decreasing promotion rates, Ranks 3 and 4, received a large 
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Figure 8.   Scenario 1 Enlisted Promotion Rates  
Figure 8 shows the monthly and annual promotion rates for enlisted 
soldiers.  In the monthly period (years 1 to 3), we see an increase in 
promotion in all Ranks up to month 16 then a decline to reach their steady 
state values.  In the annual period (years 4 to 15), Ranks 3 and 4 are the 
only Ranks that experience a sustained decrease in promotions.   
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Figure 9 indicates that officer promotion rates start at high levels, drop at 
one year and then rise again at two years before dropping to their annual average.  Rank 7 
begins with promotions rates at their maximum level of three percent per month and 
experiences a sharp drop in promotions at the 28-month mark with a promotion rate of 
two percent per month.  This drop corresponds to exhausting the population of officers 
available for promotion at the end of year two.  Rank 10 shows a constant promotion rate 
of 0.5 percent throughout the monthly period.    
There is no long-term impact on officer promotion rates following the 
initial three year build up.  Due to the size of the officer corps and the rate of promotions, 
the force is able to maintain a constant promotion rate after the initial buildup.  Only 
Rank 7 shows an increase in promotion rates over time as a result of a larger number of 
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Figure 9.   Scenario 1 Officer Promotion Rates  
Figure 9 show the officer promotion rates over the monthly (years 1 to 3) 
and annual periods (years 4 to 15).  During the monthly period, Rank 7 
shows constant maximum promotions for a year and a half, while Ranks 2 
and 3 show high promotion rates that decline, rise, and decline again.  This 
cycle is a function of the officer corps promotion pool being refilled with 
the officers that entered the prior year.  The annual period shows that the 
officer promotion rates are effectively constant with only Rank 1 showing 
sustained growth.  Rank 10 retains a constant promotion rate throughout 
the planning horizon.   
These results reflect an assumed rate of reenlistment of 50 percent for 
enlisted and 57 percent for NCOs.  These values are the average of the current ANA 
reenlistment rates.  ETS, retirement, and TIG separation in year one through ten result in 
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an annual loss of approximately 20,000 soldiers across the Force (Figure 10). The highest 
separation occurs at Rank 1, approximately 12,000 soldiers departing the service annually 
with a high in year four of 16,000 and low in year nine of 10,000.  Both Ranks 5 and 6 
show similarly high separation rates that are at 23 percent in year four and drop to 
approximately 15 percent by year 15.  The remaining Ranks 2, 3, and 4 oscillate from 
years four to eight before reaching a sustainable rate at approximately year 13. 
The officer corps also experiences varying separation but not to the same 
extent as the enlisted ranks.  Rank 11 maintains a steady, high separation rate at 20 
percent.  As the officer corps is a much smaller pool with a much higher reenlistment rate 
than the enlisted corps, progress through the ranks is only achieved by constant turnover 
at the highest rank.  The remaining officer ranks vary between 0 percent and 10 percent 




















































Figure 10.   Scenario 1 Annual Separation Rate 
Figure 10 show the separation rates for officers and enlisted from planning 
year four to planning year 15.  For the enlisted we see a relatively unstable 
separation rate for the initial 10 years of the planning horizon before the 
rates reach the steady state rates.  The officer corps reaches its steady state 
in year seven with only Rank 7 showing oscillations.    
b. Conclusions for Scenario 1 
SFGM indicates that it is possible to achieve the desired end strength, with 
the appropriate rank distribution, in under three years.  To reach this goal, KMTC must 
provide 29,000 soldiers annually for two years and approximately 18,000 to 20,000 
annually afterwards.  Initial results indicate that promotion rates must fluctuate greatly in 
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the first three years to allow for appropriate force growth over the long term.  There is 
minimal impact on long-term promotion potential across the force with one exception in 
Rank 3, which experiences a 7 percent drop over the planning horizon.  We expect 
separation rates for officers and enlisted to stabilize by year ten as the ANA reaches a 
steady state operation.  
3. Increasing the Minimum Promotion Rate 
Scenario 1 shows that large swings in promotion rates are necessary to reach the 
desired end strength for the ANA as quickly as possible.  Such variable promotion rates 
are difficult to implement effectively in an organization and a more consistent promotion 
policy is preferable.  We establish upper and lower limits based on the Scenario 1 optimal 
promotion rates.  Using the promotions rates from the 36 monthly periods, we find the 
mean and standard deviation for each rank and set the lower (upper) bound to the mean 
minus (plus) one standard deviation.  For example, the monthly promotion mean for 
Rank 1 is 0.0153 with a standard deviation of 0.006.  We subtract the standard deviation 
from the mean and find a lower promotion bound of 0.0093.  We extend this to all ranks 
as shown in Table 2.  
Rank 1 Rank 2 Rank 3 Rank 4 Rank 5 Rank 6 Rank 7 Rank 8 Rank 9 Rank 10 Rank 11
Minimum 0.0093 0.0156 0.0138 0.0074 0.0046 0.0000 0.0272 0.0113 0.0035 0.0050 0.0000
Maximum 0.0213 0.0276 0.0271 0.0120 0.0079 0.0000 0.0328 0.0200 0.0106 0.0050 0.0000
Minimum 0.1115 0.1877 0.1651 0.0893 0.0554 0.0000 0.3263 0.1355 0.0425 0.0600 0.0000











Table 2.   Scenario 2 Promotion Rates 
Table 2 provides the monthly (years 1 to 3) and annual (years 4 to 15) 
promotion rates established for Scenario 2.  Each minimum is the mean 
promotion rate for that rank minus its standard deviation from the results 
of Scenario 1, while the maximum is its mean plus its standard deviation.   
a. Analysis of Scenario 2 
As expected, establishing controlled lower and upper bounds stabilized the 
promotion rates for each Rank in the monthly and annual period.  Separation rates shifted 
Figure 11 to correspond with the stable promotion rates and present a realistic 
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expectation of annual losses.  Of most concern is the expected separation rate for Rank 7 
of 0 percent.  One possible explanation is the similar size of Rank 7 and Rank 8.  Because 
Rank 8 is slightly larger than Rank 7, Rank 7 must maintain its maximum level of 
promotion to support the growth of the total force and cannot suffer un-programmed 
separation.  The growth of the officer corps is rapid and results in the ANA achieving its 
desired end strength in approximately 28 months (four more months than Scenario 1) as 




















































Figure 11.   Scenario 2 Enlisted and Officer Separation 
Figure 11 shows the expected separation rates for both enlisted and 
officers.  Unlike Scenario 1 we see stabilization in separation for both 
enlisted and officers beginning in year seven.  These separation rates are 
acceptable showing high separation for the entry-level soldiers and 
soldiers at the senior levels of the organization with low separation in the 
mid level ranks.  The officer corps shows a different type of separation 















































Figure 12.   Scenario 2 Force Growth 
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Figure 12 shows the growth of the enlisted and officer corps of the ANA 
over the planning horizon.  The enlisted force reaches end strength at 
approximately 20 months while the officer’s reach their end strength at 
approximately 28 months. 
b. Conclusion for Scenario 2 
Close management of promotions controls the separation that occurs 
within the force and allows for sustained growth.  Present force structure requires an 
unsustainable separation rate for Rank 7 (0 percent separation from un-programmed 
losses is unlikely to occur and suggest that a larger force structure is necessary for Rank 
7). 
4 Exclusion of the Legacy Force   
Both Scenario 1 and Scenario 2 include the use of the Legacy Force for the officer 
corps.  We build Scenario 3 from the promotion rates determined in Scenario 2 and 
exclude legacy force officers during its growth.   
a. Analysis of Scenario 3  
Figure 13 shows the impact that exclusion has on the growth of the ANA.  
Exclusion of the legacy force results in higher enlisted accessions to sustain the officer 
corps growth.  Despite the increase in enlisted accessions, we see that the officer corps 
growth slows and reaches the desired end strength at year five.  This is an addition of two 















































Figure 13.   Scenario 3 ANA Growth 
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Figure 13 shows the growth of the officer and enlisted corps over the 
course of the planning horizon in Scenario 3.  Exclusion of the legacy 
force results in slower growth of the officer corps with it reaching its end 
strength in five years (two more years when compared to Scenario 2).  The 
enlisted forces growth is affected slightly as it increases its accessions to 
meet the new demand for officers.  
b. Conclusion for Scenario 3  
Exclusion of the legacy force results in an increased draw from the 
enlisted corps ,and the ANA reaching its desired end strength two years later than with 
the legacy force. 
5. Improvement of Reenlistment Rates after Three Years   
Experience in Iraq indicates that reenlistment rates improve as the army 
establishes itself and becomes a more effective and legitimate organization.  We extend 
this to the ANA following the third year of its build up.  Using Scenario 2 as our basis, 
we set reenlistment rates with a minimum reenlistment of 60 percent of the force and a 
maximum of 90 percent of the force.  Table 3 shows the reenlistment rates for each rank. 
Rank 1 Rank 2 Rank 3 Rank 4 Rank 5 Rank 6 Rank 7 Rank 8 Rank 9 Rank 10 Rank 11
0.60 0.70 0.75 0.80 0.80 1.00 0.60 0.60 0.70 0.70 1.00





Table 3.   Scenario 4 Reenlistment Rates 
a. Analysis of Scenario 4  
Increasing enlisted reenlistment rates at year three results in reductions in 
both promotions and recruitment.  Promotion rates for most ranks fall below 10 percent 
annually due to the high number of soldiers remaining in the force.  As shown in Figure 
14 only Rank 3 maintains its original promotion rate of 16 percent.  The large number of 
soldiers remaining in the force affects the number of annual recruits necessary to sustain 
the force.  Figure 15 shows the change in recruiting requirements for the ANA over the 
planning horizon.  Here we see that the total number of recruits falls from 19,000 
annually to 15,000 annually.  This reduction results in a monthly recruitment goal of 
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Figure 14.   Scenario 4 Enlisted Promotion Rates 
Figure 14 shows the impact that the increased retention has on promotion 
rates for enlisted soldiers.  While the buildup period is similar to previous 
results, the annual period shows a downward shift in all ranks except Rank 
3.  A possible explanation for this is that as more soldiers remain in a rank 















































Figure 15.   Scenario 4 Enlisted Recruiting 
Figure 15 shows the impact of increased retention on recruiting.  During 
the initial build-up there is no effect, in the annual period recruitment 
needs drop by up to 3,000 soldiers annually.     
b. Conclusion for Scenario 4  
The ability to improve reenlistment has two major effects: lowering 
promotion rates and decreasing recruitment needs.  While we assume that the lower 
promotion rates will not have an effect on reenlistment, this may not be the case as the 




6. No Enlisted Accessions 
We now evaluate the impact of enlisted accessions on the growth of the officer 
corps.  We return to Scenario 2, which bounds promotions and incorporates the Legacy 
force in the growth of the ANA.  We lower the promotion bounds for the officer corps to 
0.005 percent and prevent the accession of enlisted soldiers.  We set the recruitment level 
for officers to a monthly minimum of 20 and a maximum of 50 with the ability to exceed 
this maximum value if necessary.   
a. Analysis of Scenario 5 
Figure 16 shows the growth of the ANA subject to these new constraints.  
While the growth of the enlisted corps is unchanged, we see a dramatic change in the 
growth of the officer corps.  The officer corps fails to reach its desired end strength 
despite inclusion of the legacy force with its current limit of 600 recruits annually.  To 
meet the desired end strength, officer recruiting must exceed its maximum limit by 
approximately 200 per month for the first three years followed by an annual recruiting 
requirement of 1,200 officers.  Figure 17 shows the recruiting needs for the force over the 
planning horizon.  Figure 18 shows the impact this increased recruiting has on the time to 
reach the desired end strength.  Similar to Scenario 2, the officer corps reaches its end 















































Figure 16.   Scenario 5 Growth of the ANA 1 
Figure 16 shows the impact of no enlisted accessions on the growth of the 
officer corps with the current officer recruitment bounds.  We see that the 
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Figure 17.   Scenario 5 Officer Recruiting 
Figure 17 shows the recruiting requirements for the ANA to meet its 
officer strength needs.  Approximately 200 officers are necessary monthly 
for the officer corps to reach a stable strength, followed by an annual 
recruiting requirement of 1,200 officers.  These recruits are separate from 

















































Figure 18.   Scenario 5 Growth of the ANA 2 
Figure 18 shows the growth of the officer and enlisted corps with no 
enlisted accessions and double the officer recruiting rates.  The officer 
corps reaches its end strength in 28 months while the enlisted corps 
reaches its end strength in 20 months. 
b. Conclusions for Scenario 5 
Enlisted accessions are critical to the growth of the ANA during this initial 
buildup and into its steady state operations.  In order to reduce dependence on enlisted 
accessions, the ANA must recruit 2,400 officers for two years followed by a steady state 




Manpower modeling plays a significant role in the growth and management of 
today’s militaries.  Unfortunately, existing models do not properly capture the challenges 
facing the growth of recently established indigenous security forces.  SFGM is the first 
linear program specifically designed to grow an indigenous security force.  SFGM’s 
ability to provide high fidelity prescriptions over a short-term planning horizon and 
indications of the impact that those prescriptions have over an unknown (infinite) horizon 
is unique.  We demonstrate SFGM for the current effort to grow the Afghan National 
Army (ANA). 
SFGM simultaneously prescribes enlisted accessions, legacy force inclusions, 
reenlistment levels, and the resulting separation information, to provide a quantitative 
assessment of the impact of manpower decisions.  We find it requires at least 24 months 
for the ANA to reach its desired end strength under the current recruiting capabilities 
even with the inclusion of the legacy force, accessions of enlisted soldiers to the officer 
corps, and large fluctuations in promotion rates.  It requires four additional months when 
eliminating the large fluctuations.  We also find that the ANA must exceed the desired 
strength by up to 4,000 soldiers in order to absorb losses that occur due to the large-scale 
enlistment in the first three years.  The lieutenant end strength must also increase above 
current desired levels to provide a stable promotion base for senior ranks. 
SFGM demonstrates that it is capable of providing prescriptions for the growth of 
a force from an existing level to an end strength through our ANA scenarios.  SFGM is 
also capable of providing prescriptions for generating an army where none exists.  The 
SFGM flexibility allows planners to determine how quickly a force can grow and what 
policy decisions are necessary to facilitate that growth.  SFGM’s ability to provide a 
detailed overview of the entire force’s growth, recruitment, promotion, and separation 
over an unknown (infinite) horizon is a powerful tool in generating new indigenous 
security forces.  
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Areas for future research involve managing the growth of separate branches and 
the mixture of religious or ethnic factors in the force.  With regard to branches, there is 
specific interest in the competition that occurs at the recruitment base and its impact on 
the organization meeting its end requirements.  Finally, the inclusion of religious or 
ethnic groups and their impact on growth, recruitment, and promotion as the force 
attempts to manage equal representation as it reaches its end strength.      
 
 53
APPENDIX A: PRIMAL EQUILIBRIUM FORMULATION 
The primal equilibrium asserts that the model reaches its final equilibrium at 
period P.  In SFGM both T and P are locked as the staircase structure of the flow balance 
equation incorporates the two time indices.  This results in , , , ,r p t r P TX X=  for all p P≥ .  
For each constraint that we derive from the previous period and TIG, we add a constraint 
that replicates it over an infinite horizon.  For example:   
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 The result is that all future decisions assume the value from period P.  To capture 
this infinite sum of penalties, we modify the objective function to provide the desired 
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Where the denominator,1 α− , is the discount rate for the infinite horizon, in 
SFGM this is (1 0.95) 0.05− = .  This results in a large penalty in the final period for 
failing to achieve a sustainable equilibrium.  We now present the primal equilibrium 
model. 
1. Balance of Flow Equations 
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2. Constraints 
Constraints (1.1) and (1.2) are included in the primal formulation but not after 
P>p.  All remaining constraints for P>p are equivalent to the truncation with p=P. 
3. Objective Function 
            ,,min 1
r p
r p
r p P r
Penalties Penalties
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APPENDIX B. DUAL EQUILIBRIUM FORMULATION 
The dual equilibrium aggregates constraints for p>P to represent the penalties 
accrued for failing to reach equilibrium.  
 , , , ,(1 )
p P
r P t r p t
p P
X Xα α∞ −
=
= −∑  
 First we show that the weight applied (1 ) t Tα α −−  sums to 1: 
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2. Constraints 
Constraints (1.1) and (1.2) are included in the dual formulation but not after P>p.  
All remaining constraints for P>p are equivalent to the truncation with p=P. 
3. Objective Function 
            ,,min 1
r p
r p
r p P r
Penalties Penalties
αα α< × + ×−∑∑ ∑  (1.21D) 
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